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Abstract 
 
Cross-cultural negotiations are complex, challenging, and difficult to navigate because much of 
the Asian culture is unstated, implicit, and internalized in subtle behavioral patterns. It is like an 
iceberg; more is invisible and less is visible. To understand how the Asian negotiation values 
and practices are different from those in the West, I describe briefly the Asian cultural roots, 
highlight the major dimensions that differentiate cultures, explore the factors that influence the 
Asian  negotiation  processes  and  outcomes,  and  provide  a  list  of  practical  suggestions  for 
negotiating successful deals with Asian negotiators.     
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1. Introduction 
 
Asia’s  recent  rapid  rise  to  economic  prominence  marks  the  beginning  of  a  trend  that  will 
increase  in  the  future.  The  Chinese  economy,  the  second  largest  in  the  world,  is  currently 
attracting more direct investment than any other nation. Estimates suggest that by 2015 China’s 
purchasing power will surpass the U.S., and by 2025 China will be the world’s largest economic 
power. Similarly, India’s economic prominence in the global economy is also increasing. Today, 
India is the third most attractive foreign investment destination globally and is expected to be the 
world’s  third-largest  economy  by  2035.    In  20  years,  it  is  estimated  that  the  combined 
economies of China, India, and Japan will dominant the global economy. 
Asia’s growing economic dominance, on one hand, and the continuous search for new 
business  opportunities,  on  the  other  hand,  will  drive  Western  businesses  to  have  stronger 
economic  ties  to  Asia  in  various  forms:  joint  ventures;  wholly  foreign-owned  enterprises;  or 
direct investments.    
Cultural values and business practices in Asia are different from those in the West. The 
challenge for Western businesses is to understand those values and find effective ways for 
operating successfully in Asia. This paper focuses specifically on negotiation in Asia. First, I 
describe  briefly  the  cultural  roots  of  China,  Japan,  and  India.  Second,  I  highlight  the  major 
dimensions  that  differentiate  cultures.  Third,  I  explore  how    factors  like  relationships,  trust, 
approach  to  the  rule  of  law,  fairness,  “face,”  risk  aversion,  time  orientation,  and  emotions 
influence negotiation processes and outcomes. Fourth, I provide a list of practical suggestions 
for negotiating successful deals with Asian negotiators.     
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2. Cultural Roots 
 
Culture refers to the collective programming of the mind through socially transmitted values that 
shape the way people of the same social group think and act in various situations (Hofstede, 
1980), including in negotiation. To understand the Asians’ mind-set and negotiating style, one 
has to understand the influential cultural roots of Asia, primarily Confucianism, Taoism, Chinese 
stratagems (Art of War), Hinduism, and experiences with Western colonialism and imperialism.  
The Asian–Chinese culture is largely rooted in the teachings of Kong Fu Ze, known as 
Confucius, who lived in China from 551 to 479 B.C.  The Confucian doctrine is a pragmatic 
moral  and  non-religious  ethic  that  advocates  virtuous  behavior  such  as,  benevolence, 
righteousness, justice, propriety, trust, and sincerity. These moral ideals are designed to guide 
one’s daily life through a set of clear rules. The first rule is the stability of society.  Societal 
stability is based on five basic and unequal relationships, known as wu lun. The relationships 
are between ruler and subject, father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and 
wife, and older friend and younger friend.  Second, family harmony is the prototype of all other 
social organizations. Family members are not autonomous to pursue their self-centered desires; 
they  must  restrain  their  impulses  for  the  overall  good  of  the  family’s  interests.  Similarly, 
individual members in other social systems (groups, organizations and communities) should 
also  submit  to  the  interests  of  the  collective.    By  extension,  a  business  joint  venture,  for 
example, should be run on the basis of the family model. The role of the joint venture, therefore, 
is to serve the interests of the parent company the same way a child faithfully serves the family. 
Third, Confucianism advocates virtuous behavior towards others. This consists of having good 
manners between civilized people who also have a sense of dignity and shame (“face”). Fourth 
is mastery. One’s challenge in life consists of self-improvement - the tenacity to acquire skills 
and education through hard work and perseverance. Individuals as well as collectives ought to 
use  resources  wisely,  mainly  preserving  them  for  the  future.  Modest  spending  is  virtuous 
whereas  hedonism  and  conspicuous  consumption  are  taboos.  Other  important  values  are 
respect for tradition and reciprocity of favors and gifts.  
Confucian humanity, based on the principles of harmony,  hierarchy  and sincerity, is 
applied primarily to insiders - family and kinship in group members. It is not a universal morality 
that must be applied to all in all circumstances because “he who treats his enemy with humanity 
and virtue only harms himself….Using the rhetoric of virtue to maintain a pretense to others…is 
acceptable” (von Senger, 1991, p.12).   
Next  to  the  wide  spread  influence  of  Confucianism is  the  influence  of  Lao  Tzu,  the 
founder of the Taoist philosophy.  It advocates simplicity, contentment, spontaneity, and wu wei 
(inaction). The two key concepts of Taoism are yin and yang, and wu wei (Fang, 1999). The yin 
and yang are contrasts that complement each other and together create a harmonious whole. 
However, because life’s forces are not static, harmony is not permanent. When good changes 
to bad and fortune to misfortune, disharmony settles. Re-harmonization of the yin and the yang 
is,  therefore,  an  ongoing  process  of  mutual  adjustment.  Conflict,  from  the  yin  and  yang 
perspective, is a manifestation of imbalance between two opposing forces that can be resolved 
by mutual readjustment.         
The Taoist principle of reversion – good changes to bad or fortune turns to misfortune - 
has  profoundly  shaped  the  Asian’s  holistic  mind-set  that  recognizes  the  co-existence  of 
contrasts and sees them together as a harmonious whole. Reversion, therefore, encourages 
caution,  resilience,  and  hopefulness,  when  fortune,  for  example,  is  not  separated  from 
misfortune. In times of prosperity, one must be cautious and observe frugality to buffer against 
possible misfortune and hardship. And in times of misfortune, one must be resilient and hopeful 
awaiting fortune.      
The principle of wu wei, translated into inaction, does not literally mean passivity and 
doing nothing. It means action less activity, to act without acting.  It is the art of “mastering 
circumstances  without  asserting  ones  self  against  them;  it  is  the  principle  of  yielding  to  an 
oncoming  force  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  unable  to  harm  you”  (Fang,  1999,  p.33).    It  is  an 
approach that accepts given circumstances as they are, not resisting, but instead, finding the 
best way within the given set of circumstances. It is the water way. Water is fluid and flexible  
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and does not resist. It adapts by finding new ways to continue to flow. The principles of yin and 
yang, and wu-wei, according to Fang (1999), form the foundation of the Chinese stratagems as 
described in the writings of the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems. 
Another deeply embedded cultural root that influences Asian culture and negotiating 
style is the 2300 years old concept of Ji, or as it is known in the West, the Art of War developed 
by Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist. Ji means to plan, to create strategies or stratagems. 
Stratagems are not just simple acts involving trickery and deceit. Ji is both tactic and strategy, 
and a method of using “mental wisdom instead of physical force to win a war” (Fang, 1999, 
p.155).    
  The business arena, from the perspective of Ji (Art of War), is viewed as a competitive 
battlefield.  To  win  over  the  unworthy  competitor-enemy,  one  must  use  the  morally  justified 
stratagems, such as secrecy, deception, and espionage.    
  The militant concept of Ji was further emphasized by the Thirty-Six Stratagems written 
by an anonymous Chinese writer (Fang, 1999, p.164). Some of the 36 stratagems are: Hide a 
knife in a smile, which means win the opponent’s trust and act after his guard is down; Kill with a 
borrowed knife, which means make use of others’ resources for your gain; The beautiful woman 
which means use temptations and espionage to overpower the enemy; and Lure the tiger to 
leave the mountains, which means draw the opponent out of his natural environment to cut him 
from his source of power.  
  The Chinese stratagems have been widely disseminated through the popular literature 
and  over  time  have  penetrated  deeply  into  the  Asian’s  cultural  ethos.  When  Japan  was 
introduced to the Art of War about 1500 years ago, it was studied immediately by generals. To 
this day, Chinese managers are encouraged to read and use the Chinese stratagems “for the 
purpose of winning business in competition with foreign business people” (Fang, 1999, p.180).  
The Asian Chinese character was formed by Confucianism, which advocates humanity 
and  righteousness;  by  Taoism,  which  emphasizes  yin  and  yang,  and  wu  wei  (wisdom  of 
inaction); and by the militant principles of the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems that 
advocate the use of military-like strategies to subdue the enemy and win the war. The long 
exposure  to  these  different  teachings  has  made  the  Asian  Chinese  practical  and  morally 
flexible. They use multiple standards and apply them contextually – based on specific situations 
and circumstances - without having a sense of acting immorally. This ability to act situationally is 
the key to understanding the complexity of Asian Chinese business negotiations (Fang, 1999).   
Over time, the Confucian philosophy extended its influence from China to Japan and 
Korea. The Japanese culture also emphasizes hierarchical relationships, restraining one’s self-
interests,  and  promoting  social  and  interpersonal  harmony.  It  is  the  responsibility  of  all 
members, including leaders, to maintain and promote social harmony. To preserve harmony, for 
example,  Japanese  negotiators  refrain  from  competing  amongst  themselves.  They  measure 
successes  by  how  much  an  individual  is  contributing  to  the  collective  effort  to  become 
successful.  
The  Indian  culture  is  religiously  and  linguistically  diverse  (18  official  languages  and 
1600 dialects). It was shaped largely by the more than 5000 year old Hinduism and 3000 year 
old Buddhism that permeate all aspects of life. Hindus believe that humans are subject to a long 
series of reincarnations that ultimately, through good deeds (karma), end the cycle of re-births 
and achieve spiritual salvation. In the sequence of rebirths, one’s lifetime is temporary, and 
multiple lives are, therefore, an ongoing evolutionary process. Nothing is fixed, and nothing is 
permanent.     
Fundamentally,  Indians  believe  that  human  nature  is  bad,  immoral,  and  cannot  be 
changed  in  one’s  lifetime.  Thus,  people  should  be  monitored  and  controlled  through 
punishments. However, not all individuals are equally bad. Individuals born into the higher and 
noble  caste  of  the  Brahmins  –  priests,  poets,  and  intellectuals  --  are  endowed  with  better 
personality traits than the inferior individuals born into the lower caste of laborers, the Shudras. 
Social  hierarchy  that  structures  inequality  and  promotes  the  stability  of  the  existing  order  is 
deeply embedded in Indian history and culture. The fatalistic disposition of being born into a 
caste and the attitude that the future cannot be changed discourages one from taking initiatives 
and promoting change. These old historical and cultural forces are now changing in modern  
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India. And with the exposure to the forces of modernization and to the West, personal mastery, 
initiative, innovation, and change are encouraged.   
 
3. Recent History: The Dark Side of Foreigners 
 
The  Asian  culture  is  fundamentally  a  low-trust  culture  (Fukuyama,  1995).  Secrecy  and 
withholding  of  information  are  common,  especially  toward  foreigners.  Historically,  foreigners 
came  to  China  and  before  the  Court  of  the  Emperor  as  requestors  -  asking  for  something 
(Faure, 1998). But in recent history, foreigners – the colonialists and the imperialists - came to 
Asia as takers. They used their military superiority to control and exploit. Britain, for example, 
colonized India and attacked China in the first Opium War from 1839 to 1842 to force China to 
import British Opium. The defeated Chinese were forced to sign The Treaty of Nanjing where 
they had to commit to fixed tariffs of British goods, cede the island of Hong Kong to Queen 
Victoria, and pay reparation for the cost of the war to the British government. The British victory 
paved the way to resuming illegal drug trafficking within China. China, rejecting British pressure 
to legalize the opium trade in China, had to defend itself again in the Second Opium War, from 
1856  to  1860.  In  1860  joint  British  and  French  forces  attacked  Beijing,  burned  down  the 
Summer Palace and smashed its treasures. China, weakened by two wars, could no longer 
resist  the  pressure  to  legalize  the  trade  of  opium.  “Beyond  any  doubt,  by  1860  the  ancient 
civilization that was China had been thoroughly defeated and humiliated by the West” (Hsu, 
2000, p.219). 
Ancient civilizations, like the Japanese and the Chinese, have a profound sense of the 
past. The Chinese, for example, regularly remind foreign negotiators of “the opium wars of the 
nineteen  century”  (Cohen,  2002,  p.36).  The  resentful  negative  sentiments  toward  foreigners 
were expressed in the strong words of the former Chinese Premier, Mao: “The imperialists will 
never  lay  down  their  butcher  knives,  and  they  will  never  become  Buddha  ‘til  their  doom” 
(Blackman, 1997, p.25).   
The legacy of foreigners in Asia is dark. They have been seen as dangerous, exploitive, 
unethical, and untrustworthy. The new and modern form of joint ventures, for many Chinese, is 
just another exploitive method designed by the rich capitalists to get richer. In their view, rich 
foreigners build factories and operate mines and banks to control the economy.  Still, to this 
day, Indian and Japanese negotiators are conscious “of the racist and imperialist outrages to 
which their countries were subjected in the colonial era” (Cohen, 2002, p.36). Indians, known to 
be the most nationalistic people, are extremely sensitive to economic activities by foreigners, 
especially investments that will affect India’s future welfare.  
 
4. Cultural Dimensions 
 
The  Asian  culture  is  primarily  rooted  in  the  Confucian,  Taoist,  and  Hindu  philosophies.  The 
central  tenets  of  these  philosophies  have  been  synthesized  into  a  number  of  cultural 
dimensions  that  differentiate  between  eastern  and  Western  societies.  The  major  cultural 
differentiators  are:  Individualism  versus  collectivism;  Power  distance;  Uncertainty  avoidance; 
Femininity  versus  masculinity  (Hofstede,  1980);  Confucian  dynamism  (Hofstede  and  Bond, 
1988); High versus low context; and the concept of time  -- Monochromic versus Polychromic 
(Hall, 1973).   
 
4.1. Individualism - Collectivism 
 
This dimension refers to the extent to which a society recognizes an individual’s right to pursue 
his personal goals. Individualistic societies like the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and 
Australia, are imbued with each citizen’s legal rights. People are concerned, primarily, about 
their own self-directed goals, needs, and interests. In contrast, collective societies like, China, 
Japan, Korea, and Singapore emphasize collective goals over individual goals and encourage 
self-sacrifice for the good of the whole. Self-interested behavior is discouraged and is perceived 
as selfish. A person’s duty is to conform and contribute to the common good of the group that  
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he is embedded in – the family, group, organization, and community. Social relationships tend to 
be  permanent  and  people  are  more  likely  to  keep  their  social  relationships  and  affiliations 
(alumni, friends from military service) for a long period of their lives (Hui, 1990). Success in a 
collective culture is defined in terms of an individual’s commitment and effort to help the group 
achieve its goal.  
 
4.2. Power Distance 
 
This refers to the degree to which power is distributed equally across social groups. In high 
power  distance  –  hierarchical  cultures  like,  China,  Japan,  and  India  --  the  less  powerful 
members  expect  and  accept  that  power  will  be  distributed  unequally.  Positional  power  and 
social status are stressed and interpersonal relationships are vertical - based on differences of 
stature, age, gender, and education. The less powerful members of the social group typically 
refrain from expressing their opinion and suppress their contrarian views. Rarely, if ever, do they 
challenge high authority or take personal responsibility to make decisions. In low power distance 
– egalitarian-oriented cultures like the United States and the United Kingdom  - rank, status, 
gender, and seniority, although recognized, are less emphasized. Knowledge, competency, and 
independence  are  valued.  In  China,  for  example,  when  seniority  and  competence  are 
incongruent, the Chinese will choose the experience of the elders over competency.     
 
4.3. Uncertainty Avoidance  
 
This refers to the extent to which individuals feel comfortable (or uncomfortable) in ambiguous 
and unstructured situations. Uncertainty represents risk; certainty represents no risk. In high 
uncertainty  avoidance  societies  like  Japan  and  China,  individuals  prefer  to  operate  in 
environments that are less risky, more clear and defined. Asians, in general, are risk averse and 
make decisions after careful evaluation of a large amount of information. Change is carefully 
measured, slow, and incremental. In contrast, in low uncertainty avoidance cultures like Israel 
and  Canada,  individuals  are  comfortable  in  fuzzy  and  unclear  situations.  They  make  quick 
decisions based on a limited amount of information, embrace change, and accept bold ideas.  
 
4.4. Femininity - Masculinity  
 
This refers to the extent to which the characteristics of the social group are more stereotypically 
feminine  or  masculine.  On  the  masculinity-femininity  continuum,  Asian  cultures  are 
characterized as feminine. They are concerned with people’s feelings and emphasize harmony 
and cooperation. Western cultures are seen as masculine and achievement oriented because 
they emphasize competitiveness and assertiveness. 
 
4.5. Confucian Dynamism (Future Orientation) 
 
This dimension is related to the importance of the future and hard work. Long-term goals are 
achieved through persistence and perseverance, especially in the face of difficulties. The Asian-
Chinese  culture  is  future  oriented,  emphasizes  thrift,  the  conservation  of  resources,  and 
investment  for  the  future.  In  contrast,  the  time  orientation  of  Western  societies  is  short. 
Immediate  gratification  and  quick  results  are  sought  and  encouraged.  It  is,  therefore,  not 
surprising that the personal savings of the Chinese and Japanese are 26 and 22 percent of 
personal income, respectively, whereas the personal saving of Americans is only nine percent.  
 
4.6. High Context - Low Context 
 
This dimension refers to how people communicate. In China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
and Korea, known as high context cultures, communication is indirect, implicit, suggestive, and 
vague. This form of communication, says Bryan Huang, the President of Bearing Point Greater 
China confuses “almost all Americans and Europeans when they first visit Japan and China.  
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Western culture places a high value on being very specific. But in Japan and China, says Bryan 
Huang, “things are more ambiguous, on purpose” (Fernandez and Underwood, 2006, p.83). An 
American executive commenting on his business experience in Japan said: “I make deals all 
over  the  world.  Everywhere  I  go,  I  can  pretty  much  tell  where  I  stand  with  my  clients. 
Everywhere, that is except Japan” (Graham, 1986, p.65). 
Asians believe that the indirect way is the virtuous way to maintain harmony and “face.” 
According to a Chinese proverb, only the devil walks in a straight line.    
Although the Asian form of communication is indirect, it is complete. To uncover the 
complete information, however, you must look everywhere - in the message, in between the 
lines, in the facial expression and the body language, and in what is not being said. For Israelis, 
Americans,  and  Canadians,  who  communicate  explicitly,  this  form  of  communication  is 
mysterious and difficult to interpret.  
 
4.7. Temporal Orientation: Monochronic – Polychronic 
  
Asians have a polychronic attitude towards time. Time is fluid, cyclical, recursive and natural like 
the seasons. As in nature, where the seasons have their natural rhythms, human interactions 
also follow a natural flow of time. One, therefore, should naturally blend into the pace of events 
and allow time to take its course. Time should not restrict the process flow of human interaction. 
Human interaction should not be forced into pre-set, artificial schedules and plans.    
The Westerner’s temporal orientation is monochronic -- time is linear, inflexible, and 
sequential. The schedule for Americans “is almost sacred” (Hall, 1973, p.157). It is a limited 
resource that should be managed well and maximized. Fixed schedules, segmentation of time, 
promptness, performance schedules, and deadlines are emphasized.      
Edward  Hall,  a  linguistic  scholar,  suggests  that  American  negotiators  prefer  a  pre-
determined and sequential agenda where the movement is linear from one issue to the next. 
They lose their balance when their counterpart negotiator changes the structure of the agenda 
by rearranging the sequence of the issues (1973). Asian negotiators have greater facility with a 
“messy”  and  less  structured  agenda.  They  easily  move  cyclically  between  issues  and  can 
handle multiple issues in parallel.  
 
5. Culture and Negotiation 
 
Research and experience have shown that culture influences negotiators’ mind-sets, behaviors, 
and styles. In this section, I describe how cultural differentiators (e.g., collectivism, high power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, Confucian dynamism, and high context) and cultural elements 
such  as,  distinction  between  in  group  and  out-group,  relationships,  trust,  legal  framework, 
fairness,  risk  behavior,  “face,”  time  perspective,  emotions,  decisions  style,  and  teamwork  
influence the negotiation style of Asian negotiators.    
In-Group and Out-Group. 
In the Asian strong familial system, there is a distinction between the family and kinship 
social network - the in-group system - and outsider and strangers in the out-group system. In 
Japan,  for  example,  there  are  three  differentiating  circles.  The  innermost  circle,  the  Miuchi, 
comprises of trusted family and close friends. The Nakama, refers to friends and relatives who 
are mutually dependent on assistance. The most outer circle is the Tanin. It refers to strangers 
with whom there are no relationships.    
The behavioral norms in the in-group system are different from those in an out-group 
system.  In the in-group, members are seen as long-term trusted family and friends on whom 
you can rely and with whom you must collaborate rather than compete. Keeping interpersonal 
harmony in the in-group is a duty, but with members in the out-group, who are naturally not 
trusted, self-interested competitive  behavior is acceptable. One  need not be concerned  with 
maintaining harmony and solidarity, especially with out-group exploitive foreigners.  
The  distinction  between  the  in-group  and  the  out-group  has  a  profound  impact  on 
Asians’ moral and social behavior, including negotiation. It affects the nature of relationships, 
trust, openness, sincerity, and commitment that shape the Asians’ negotiating style.   
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5.1. Negotiation Style 
 
Negotiators may come to the table with two distinctly different motivations: claiming value and 
creating value (Lax and Sebenius, 1986).  Negotiators with a value claiming attitude see the 
negotiation  as  a  zero-sum  game  and  a  conquest.  Value  claiming  negotiators  conceal  their 
interests, do not share information, bluff, exaggerate the value of their concessions, and use 
hard tactics like threats and ultimatums. In contrast, negotiators with a value creation attitude 
exchange  information  more  openly,  disclose  their  interests,  invest  in  building  relationships, 
nurture trust, and search for mutually beneficial options designed to create a win-win outcome.    
The  true  nature  of  negotiation,  however,  is  mixed-motive,  a  combination  of  creating 
value  followed  by  claiming  value  –  a  continuous  process  of  cooperation  and  competition. 
Effective negotiators cooperate in order to create value and then move competitively to claiming 
value for themselves.  
The Asian Chinese negotiating style is rooted in the duality of the Confucian teaching of 
cooperation  and  the  Chinese  competitive  stratagems  (Fang,  1999).  It  is,  as  Guy  Faure 
describes, a joint quest of working together, on one hand, and a ruthless mobile warfare, on the 
other  hand  (1998:  140).  When  counterpart  negotiators  are  seen  as  adversaries  and  their 
interests are perceived to be in conflict, the mobile warfare style is used – the application of the 
military principles of the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems. The primary objective of 
mobile  warfare  is  to  exhaust,  destabilize,  and  weaken  the  adversary  by  various  means, 
including concealment, deception, and espionage.  A mobile warfare negotiator will not hesitate 
to disseminate false information and misrepresent the facts in order to mislead. Asian Chinese 
negotiators  often  increase  their  bargaining  edge  by  stimulating  open  competition  between 
competing suppliers who are aware of each other. It is also not uncommon to intentionally leak 
a  competitor’s  proposal  to  the  other  competitors  in  order  to  pressure  them  to  improve  their 
proposals. The objective of mobile warfare, however, is not to completely destroy the other side. 
Rather,  it  is  to  weaken  the  adversary.    In  negotiation  it  means  reducing  substantially  the 
bargaining power of the other side. The Chinese who have used the mobile warfare strategy are 
known  as  tough,  shrewd,  and  tenacious  negotiators.  They  are  skilled  in  extracting  sizeable 
concessions  and  give  concessions  only  after  a  long  fight  while  creating  an  appearance  of 
mutuality, reciprocity, and generosity.  
The joint  quest,  in contrast to the  mobile warfare, is a collaborative and ambiguous 
process of searching patiently for mutual value through fairness. It is a harmonious process of 
value  creation  that  can  be  achieved  not  by  presenting  bluntly  opposing  positions  or  by 
extracting concessions, but rather by engaging in delicate “dance,” of adjusting interests without 
explicitly  disclosing  the  opposing  interests.  It  is  an  invisible,  subtle,  and  refined  process  of 
exchanges which makes Western negotiators often stumble like new dancers dancing in the 
dark.     
The duality of the mobile warfare and the joint quest is expressed in the Japanese word 
of  negotiation.  One  meaning  of  negotiation  is  kosho.    It  implies  conflict  of  interests,  verbal 
debate,  fight,  and  the  use  of  strategy  in  order  to  secure  one’s  interests.  Another  meaning 
implies engaging constructively in a conference, discussing issues and exchanging concessions 
in order to create a deal (March, 1990, p.84).     
Asian negotiators are adept in using cooperative and competitive styles, as both are 
deeply  embedded  in  the  different  cultural  teachings:  the  cooperative  Confucianism  and  the 
confrontational Taoism and the art of war.  
The  joint  influence  of  East  and  West  helped  Indians  incorporate  opposing  value 
systems.  The  cultural  blend  of  Western  individualism  and  achievement,  on  one  hand,  and 
eastern  collectivism  and  hierarchical  order,  on  the  other  hand,  shaped  a  complex  Indian 
negotiating style. Indian negotiators, adopting individualistic characteristics, can be aggressive, 
competitive, and achievement oriented. At the same time, operating in a culture of distinct social 
hierarchy,  power  distance,  compliance  and  expected  loyalty,  they  can  be  passive  and 
agreeable. They are very sensitive to context and adapt well to changing circumstances.     
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5.2. Negotiating with Outsiders 
 
Asians, especially Japanese, in their trusted in-group network, are concerned with harmony and 
do not like to negotiate. Internal negotiations are “on the basis of give and take, harmony and 
long-term  interest”  (March,  1990,  p.15).  Given  a  choice,  the  Japanese  would  rather  not 
negotiate as the  head of a Japanese research institute in negotiation noted: “We Japanese 
really  don’t  like  negotiating  at  all!”  (Cohen,  2002,  p.77).  Informal  contacts  between  the 
negotiators give them an opportunity to negotiate without negotiating. However, with aggressive 
and arrogant foreign negotiators, the Japanese negotiate defensively and use the kosho, the 
fighting  negotiating  style  (March,  1990).  Similarly,  the  Chinese  promote  the  use  of  mobile 
warfare when dealing with foreigners. In fact, Chinese managers “are educated to make use of 
the Art of War and The Thirty-Six Stratagems to deal with foreign business people” (Fang, 1999, 
p.180). The authors of Sun Tsu’s art of war and enterprise management write: 
 
In order not to be tricked in dealings with capitalist enterprises and also  
for the purpose of winning business in competition with foreign business 
people and making our products enter into the international markets, we  
need to study Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Use this magic weapon handed down  
from our ancestors to defeat them (Li et al. 1986, p.12). 
      
The historically lingering suspicion of foreigners is the backdrop of negotiations in Asia. 
Recent  negative  business  incidents  have  reinforced  the  prevailing  sense  of  distrust.  For 
example,  promises  by  Westerners  to  transfer  modern  technology  to  China  were  purposely 
delayed  until  a  new  generation  of  technology  was  developed  so  that  the  old  one  would  be 
transferred.  Foreigners,  Asians  say,  are  motivated  by  cheap  labor  and  short-term  financial 
gains. They don’t have a long term-commitment to doing business in Asia. Resentful of another 
foreign exploitation, Asians are determined to prevent the foreigners from “taking advantage of 
the  current  situation  to  make  money  at  China’s  expense”  (Faure,  2000,  p.166).  They  feel 
morally justified in taking revenge and exploiting the exploiters, and “plucking the chickens” -- 
the  rich  and  powerful  Western  corporations.  Asian’s  defensive  mindset  against  foreign 
exploitations, naturally lead Asian negotiators to use the value claiming style – the 36 Chinese 
stratagems and the Japanese kosho. 
  
5.3. Relationships 
 
While  the  Asian-Chinese  and  the  Japanese  can  easily  use  the  Art  of  War,  the  competitive 
mobile warfare, and the kosho value claiming negotiating style with untrustworthy counterparts, 
they  can  also  use  the  magnanimous  and  benevolent  Confucian  joined  quest  style  with 
trustworthy counterparts. In negotiations between China and lower status countries, like Zambia 
and Thailand, Chinese negotiators were cooperative and accommodating (Fang, 1999).   
Relationships: Guanxi and Kankei 
Consistent with the Confucian teaching of promoting harmonious social relationships, 
Asians  put  a  premium  on  relationships  and  friendship.  They  invest  in  building  interpersonal 
connections and in creating a dependable social network of friends and colleagues, known as 
guanxi. In Japan, the concept of guanxi is known as kankei. 
Asians prefer to do business within their own trusted network  – with individuals and 
entities  that  are  “known  quantities”  (Shenkar  and  Ronen,  1987,  p.271).  Reputation  without 
familiarity is not enough. In the first meeting between two shipping giants, the Greek Aristotle 
Onassis and the Chinese Sir YK Pao, Onassis, moving quickly during the customary exchange 
of pleasantries, proposed to Pao a business joint venture.  Pao was appalled by how a stranger 
could make such an offer (Hutcheon, 1990).  Solid relationships, friendship, and guanxi should 
not be underestimated when one is dealing in Asia.  
Asians put a premium on personal relationships because they provide assurances that 
reduce  the  risk  of  doing  business.  The  legal  system  in  Asia  does  not  provide  the  same 
assurances  as  the  legal  system  in  the  West.  In  China,  for  example,  “the  law  has  been  
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susceptible to manipulation by the authorities and hence provided relatively little protection or 
stability” (Seligman, 1989, p.127).    
To foster relationships, Asians mastered the art of hospitality, flattery, real friendship, 
and sometimes false friendship. In the Chinese and Japanese relationship-focused cultures, 
deals evolve from already established relationships. Deals cannot be made between strangers, 
unless  they  are  introduced  through  the  guanxi  network.  Because  relationships  come  first, 
Asians will take as long as it is necessary to nourish and establish them before moving to the 
deal. In Asia one has to be a relationship-negotiator. 
   Westerners,  in  contrast,  are  contract-focused. They  unbundle  the  business  from  the 
personal,  a  separation  difficult  for  the  Chinese,  for  example,  to  comprehend.  For  Western 
negotiators, deals emerge first and foremost from shared interests, and relationships might later 
evolve during the negotiation process or post negotiation. This is the contract-negotiator style. 
For the Indians, in contrast to the Chinese and the Japanese, socializing and building 
relationships  are  much  less  important  at  the  outset  of  the  negotiation.  They  focus  more  on 
building relationships during the negotiations and in that sense they are contract-negotiators.  
While relationships facilitate trust, flexibility, and loyalty, they also create obligations. 
From a Western perspective, relationships in Asia are a double-edged sword because they are 
used to make new demands, reopen contracts, renegotiate already settled terms and demand 
new concessions. Westerners’ refusal to accommodate new demands may well be interpreted 
as unfriendly and would jeopardize the relationships.          
 
5.4. Trust from the Heart 
 
The way members of a social group develop trust and emphasize different trust factors differ 
across cultures. Asians have a strong inclination to trust insiders -- people related to family and 
kinship group (Fukuyama, 1995, p.75) and distrust outsiders because they cannot be dealt with 
in the normal way. In the normal way, interactions among a kinship group carry low risk. If one 
misbehaves, for example, it can be discussed with a brother and a redress can be sought from 
parents. Delicate matters can be handled by a go between uncles. The “insiders” have a shared 
past, a future together, and obligations to fulfill, outsiders do not (Wolf, 1968, p.3).   
Trust  in  Asia  is  based  on  individual  trust,  cultivated  by  interpersonal  relationships. 
Asians do business with trustworthy individuals and not with the faceless organizations they 
represent. Organizational trust is a Western notion which is foreign to Asians.   
There are two types of trust. Trust from the head or cognitive-based trust, and trust from 
the heart, or affect-based trust (McAllister, 1995; Chua et al. 2009). Westerners tend to trust 
more  from  the  head.  They  make  a  cognitive  decision  to  trust  based  on  the  person’s 
competency, integrity, sincerity, and reliability. Easterners, in contrast, tend to trust more from 
the  heart.  A  Japanese  executive,  for  example,  “…is  making  gut  level  judgments  about  the 
integrity,  reliability,  commitment….of  his  American  counterpart”  (Graham,  1986,  p.61).  
Establishing trust from the heart is a long process developed through trust factors like personal 
relationship,  openness,  mutual  help,  mutual  understanding,  and  the  formation  of  emotional 
bonds (Tan and Chee, 2005).  
In Asia, trust from the heart influences a wide range of business decisions, including 
appointments and promotion of senior executives. In Taiwan, for example, appointments and 
promotions  of  general  managers  and  directors  to  the  board  in  large  businesses  is  based 
primarily on personal trust. Experience and competence, although important, are not sufficient. 
Personal  trust  is  a  necessary  condition  (Kao,  1996).    And  in  China,  “rather  than  relying  on 
objective  performance  criteria,  personnel  decisions  are  made  on  the  basis  of  the  boss’s 
personal relations with his subordinates, even if they are not relatives” (Fukuyama, 1995, p.77). 
Asians, using the family model of relationships as a prototype, are more likely to mix 
between emotional, social, and business elements. The implication, for foreign negotiators, is to 
invest patiently in the natural process of building personal trust from the heart followed by the 
head.  
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5.5. Legal Contracts and the Law 
 
Westerners are accustomed to a long tradition of a strong legal system and to the rule of law. 
Contracts  and  agreements  are  viewed  as  solid  legal  instruments  to  be  strictly  enforced,  if 
violated.  Among  Asian  nations,  there  are  significant  differences  in  terms  of  the  level  of 
development of the legal system and the rule of law. While Singapore, for example, has a strong 
legal system and strict enforcement of laws, China is still far behind. Not only have Chinese 
private citizens violated intellectual property rights; the Chinese State Statistical Bureau has too. 
It pirated a data management program of a U.S. computer software company. The U.S. firm 
protested and argued that if the government does not respect intellectual property laws, how 
could private citizens be expected to follow the law? The State Statistical Bureau saw the point 
and  decided  to  comply  with  the  law  and  offered  “just  $500  for  the  entire  bureau’s  national 
network” (Oliver, 1996, p.12).     
Asians have a long tradition of doing business without contracts. Raised with Confucian 
values and a preference for doing business within the trusted guanxi, the in-group network, they 
rely more on sincerity and “face” than on legal contracts.  A verbal commitment is sufficient and 
binding. Asians often feel insulted when their legalistic negotiating counterparts specify in detail 
penalties  or  remedies  for  not  honoring  commitments.  Legal  contracts  are  merely  a  tangible 
expression  of  something  more  important  -  the  relationships  being  created  by  the  parties. 
Contracts  are  not  treated  as  fixed  instruments,  simply  because  one  can  not  foresee  all 
circumstances.  To  reduce  risk,  Westerners  force  the  future’s  eventualities  into  “what  if”  by 
“legalizing” them into a long and detailed legal instrument. Life changing circumstances, in the 
Asian  tradition,  cannot  be  predicted  nor  “contained.”    Contracts,  therefore,  are  inherently 
deficient and can never be completely fair because they cannot deal fully with the future. Signed 
contracts are but a representation of current conditions and thus cannot be final. And when 
circumstances change and the existing contract is no longer perceived as a fair deal, it should 
be opened and renegotiated in order to deal with the new circumstances and strike a new and 
fair arrangement between the parties. Asians believe that better than a legal contract is the 
human touch -- good relationships, friendship, trust, flexibility, “face,” and mutual considerations. 
These  personal,  social  and  psychological  “instruments”  deal  better  with  the  future  and  its 
unknowns than legal contracts.   
Confucianism  emphasizes  moral  authority  and  de-emphasizes  legal  power.  Good 
leaders, for example, rule through their superior moral character and not through the power of 
the law. The law does not provide solutions to problems; people do when they internalize moral 
values and have “face” - a sense of shame.  This doctrine of self and social regulation can 
explain why China did not develop a Western-like legal system. In fact, legalism has been seen 
as coercion and always viewed with distrust.   
The judicial system and the rule of law in Asia are not as advanced as in the West. In 
China,  for  example,  the  judicial  system  has  just  begun  to  employ  professional  people, 
standards, and practices. In the 1980’s it was staffed primarily with military personnel who had 
no legal training and who were primarily loyal to the Party. The judiciary, says Norman Givant, 
the Managing Partner of the Freshfields, Buckhaus and Deringer law office in China, “is still 
problematic  and  has  a  long  way  to  go”  (Fernandez  and  Underwood,  2006,  p.218).  Senior 
executives of multi-national companies who are familiar with the Chinese legal system suggest 
that it should be avoided as a forum of redressing disputes. Gary Dirks of British Petroleum 
China,  for  example,  would  rather  negotiate  disputes  out  of  court  than  go  to  court.  Charles 
Browne,  President  of  Du  Pont  China  prefers  to  resolve  problems  directly  with  counterparts 
rather than go to court because, he says, “in negotiation you would come out with a result that is 
still better than a court judgment”   (Fernandez and Underwood, 2006, p.218). 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  Chinese  legal  system  has  been  making  a 
substantial effort to improve itself in the past few years. Presently, there are many business 
laws designed to address business issues. But a still sensitive area is the interpretation of these 
laws, which tend to be very broad and vague. When a U.S. electrical goods manufacturer that  
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partnered in a joint venture with a Chinese company wanted to fire a Chinese manager who 
restrained the company from expanding its existing product line in China, the Chinese local 
labor bureau refused to approve it (Oliver, 1996, p.12)    
The evolving legal system and rule of law, the wide variation in the interpretation of laws 
and regulations, and the relaxed enforcement of the laws in China make it a challenge to do 
business in some parts of Asia. A U.S. industrial manufacturer learned this lesson in 1988 in 
China when it partnered with a state-owned Chinese company. Based on a signed contract, the 
US partner committed to buy each year a fixed number of batteries at a fixed price each year. It 
was surprised to get a bill 50 percent higher than expected. After refusing to pay the bill the 
Chinese government confiscated the plant. A year later the American company won its case in 
the international courts but was unable to collect the $8.3 million compensation (Oliver, 1996, 
p.13)    
Foreigners  should  realize  that  the  legal  power  of  agreements  and  contracts  varies 
between the West and the East and within countries in Asia.  Westerners should restrain their 
instincts to rush to court and litigate and adopt multiple ways for managing disputes. Resolving 
disputes the “local way” of informal influence and mediation behind the scene is most often the 
most effective way.  
 
5.6. Concept of Fairness 
  
In the West, economic fairness is based on equity (proportionality) and equal reciprocity. Parties 
that invest more resources in a venture are entitled to a greater share of the pie, and when they 
exchange concessions, they expect that the exchange will be roughly equal, value for value.   
In Asia fairness is perceived differently. When Thailand wanted to sell rice to China as 
an economic favor, China agreed. Describing the negotiation with the accommodating Chinese, 
a Thai negotiator commented: “…in our tradition the less powerful party is not expected to be as 
generous as the more powerful one” (Blackman, 1997, p.26). Fairness in the Asian tradition is 
contextual and is based on needs. It is measured by the economic conditions of the company 
with whom you negotiate, which party has more resources, and which party is in a greater need. 
Fairness based on needs implies that negotiators representing wealthy foreign corporations are 
expected to be generous with their local and needy partners. To not act generously is to not be 
a good friend, as friends always help each other.  However, in order to preserve “face” the 
appearance of symmetry and equality must be maintained.  
 
5.7. Risk Behavior 
 
“He  who  does  nothing  makes  no  mistakes,”  is  one  of  the  central  rules  of  the  Chinese 
bureaucracy. Asians do not behave as autonomous negotiators, especially when it comes to 
taking risks and assuming personal responsibility. For Asians, not to act is rational because the 
rewards for negotiating successfully, as Fang (1999) argues, are minimal, whereas the penalties 
for making mistakes are great. That makes Asians risk averse. To minimize risks they tend to 
make decisions based on carefully evaluating a large amount of information. A Chinese buyer 
will  spend  an  enormous  amount  of  time  collecting  information  on  product  technology  and 
performance, making the purchase process long. This tendency to “play it safe” often hinders 
the  introduction  of  creative,  bold,  and  risky  ideas.  When  dealing  with  Asian  negotiators, 
especially Japanese, moving forward patiently and making incremental progress, generally is 
more productive. 
While  Chinese  and  Japanese  are  risk  averse,  Indians,  like Westerners,  see  risk  as 
something that should be managed wisely rather than avoided.   
 
5.8. Concept of “Face”  
 
“Face,” or human dignity, is gained when individuals behave morally, have prestige associated 
with accomplishments, and most importantly, show genuine concern for the collective’s interests 
– family, social network, and the community. “Face” is a formidable social control mechanism –  
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rewarding  people  with  prestige  when  they  respond  positively  to  social  expectations  and 
punishing them with a loss of “face” when they do not.  
The concept of “face” is common to all societies but most salient in the Asian culture. It 
is rooted in the Confucian philosophy of social harmony. A social group maintains inter-personal 
and social harmony when individuals restrain their aggressive instincts and do not confront each 
other  directly, nor mention difficulties. An  employee,  for example,  would refrain from raising 
concerns with a superior because “Troubling the boss can be considered rude and would likely 
be  seen  as  admission  that  the  manager  was  to  some  degree  responsible  for  the  problem” 
(Fernandez & Underwood, 2006, p.83). Consequently, problems and difficulties are dealt with 
only when they can no longer be avoided. Postponed difficulties and avoided conflicts usually 
become more acute at a later stage.       
The Western’s style of conflict management tends to be open and direct. It is indeed 
challenging for foreigners to communicate effectively and manage difficulties and, at the same 
time, preserve their counterparts’ “face” because “if you let somebody lose ‘face,’ it will be very 
difficult  to  rebuild  a  trusting  relationship,”  says  Jun  Tang,  the  president  of  Microsoft  China 
(Fernandez and Underwood, 2006, p.84). 
  Much of Asians’ inactions and actions are related to protecting against losing “face” or 
to gaining “face.” On the inaction side, Asian negotiators, for example, are uncomfortable about 
expressing direct opinions because they do not want to run the risk of disrespecting or even 
offending  their  chief  negotiator.  On  the  action  side,  Asian  negotiators  are  relentless  in  their 
conquest for concessions. They are motivated by the desire to look good and have a better 
“face” (Schnepp, et al. 1990, p.148).  The better the deal the more “face” they obtain.   
 
5.9. Time Perspective, Pace, and Synchronization 
 
When Jeanne Kirkpatrick, then American ambassador to the United Nations, asked the foreign 
ministers of the six ASEAN countries if there were good prospects for settling the Cambodian 
conflict, they all said, “Yes.” And when she asked: “Do you think it will be very soon?” they all 
said, “Oh yes, very soon.”  “Well, how soon?” she wanted to know. “Oh, about five years’ time,” 
they  said.  She  was  shocked.  Five  years  for  an  American  is  certainly  not  soon  (Koh,  1996, 
p.316), but is for Easterners. The Asians’ sense of time was perhaps best expressed by the 
former Chinese Premier, Mao Zedong. When a journalist asked him to comment on the French 
revolution of 1789, he said that it is too early to comment on it (Faure, 1998, p.145). 
The short time perspective of Westerners clearly stands in contrast to the Easterners’ 
time perspective. When the University of New South Wales (UNSW), an Australian university, 
opened its Singapore campus in May 2007, many were optimistic. But only a few months later, 
UNSW announced that the campus would be closed immediately. It pulled out of Singapore 
because  it  was  able  to  recruit  only  148  applicants,  short  of  the  projected  300  for  the  first 
semester. This decision reinforced the common perception of foreign entities’ short-term mind-
set lacking the Confucian virtue of persistence and tenacity that Saburo Matsuo, a Japanese 
salesman of a major securities company demonstrated. Matsuo, interested in the business of 
one of Japan’s richest man, stood in front of his house and bowed to him for six months, six 
mornings a week, but he was ignored by the rich man. One morning, however, Matsuo was 
caught in a heavy downpour without an umbrella, and the famous rich man invited him to get 
into his car. There they had their first conversation about the stock market. Matsuo’s patience 
and persistence impressed the rich man who became a new client (March, 1990, p.18). Asia is 
a long-term investment that requires patience, persistence, and tenacity.   
Short or long-term orientations influence the pace – how fast or slow -- negotiations 
move.  For many Western  negotiators,  the  pace  of negotiating  with  Asians  is  painfully  slow. 
Asians believe that a negotiator should be calm, and move slowly. To lose your serenity and to 
negotiate  anxiously  under  time  pressure  is  to  put  yourself  unwisely  at  a  psychological 
disadvantage.  Even  when  Asian  negotiators  have  an  interest  in  expediting  the  negotiation 
process, they will project an attitude of not being in a hurry. They understand the strategic value 
of time and are mindful  of controlling the  pace  of the negotiation. They slow  it or  hasten  it 
according to their interests.   
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The slow pace of the negotiations in Asia can be attributed to several factors. First is 
the  general  belief  that  a  negotiator  cannot  maximize  the  benefits  in  a  quick  negotiation. 
Because negotiation, as many believe, is a war of attrition where resilience and patience are 
tested, one must be patient.  Second is the management of impression. To conclude the deal 
quickly may be seen by the negotiator’s superiors as “premature” and as if the negotiator did not 
try  hard enough to maximize gains. Third is the symbolic “game of time.” To move forward 
quickly signals anxiety and weakness. It sends a clear message that you need the deal more. 
Not to appear eager and weak, Asians play the “game of time.” Fourth is risk aversion. Asian 
negotiators  refrain  from  taking  personal  responsibility  and  constantly  go  back  and  forth  to 
consult with their superiors. The fifth reason that explains the slow pace of negotiating with 
Asians is the nature of their decision making process. To maintain harmony, diffuse risks, and 
save face, Asians, especially Japanese, employ a consensus decision-making process. 
The  pace  of  the  negotiation  influences  the  degree  to  which  negotiators  are 
synchronized. Effective negotiators find a way to mutually adjust their pace and synchronize it – 
moving together at the same pace. Often, however, Western and Asian negotiators move at 
different paces and consequently find themselves not synchronized. In the first phase of the 
preliminaries -- small talks and building relationships -- Westerners are brief. After 10 minutes of 
chit chat they jump into the task of give and take. For Asians, the long preliminary phase is 
perhaps the most critical.  It is made of social entertainment, ceremonies, and the exchange of 
gifts  (Graham,  1986).  In  the  second  phase  of  the  actual  negotiation  –  give  and  take  --, 
Westerners are also brief. Asians are interested first and foremost in fully understanding the 
negotiation  context  and  ask  many  clarifying  questions.  When  the  Americans  and  Japanese 
negotiate, for example, after the Americans state their positions, “…the Japanese tendency is to 
listen quite carefully, to ask for additional details, and to say nothing at all committal. This lack of 
response is likely to frustrate the American side, which wants a counter-proposal put on the 
table so that give-and-take can begin” (Cohen, 2002, p.85).  Westerners ask a few questions 
and move quickly to persuading and making concessions quite early in the negotiation process. 
The Japanese make concessions only at the very end of the negotiation. In the final stage – the 
closing of the deal --, Western negotiators who typically have authority to seal the deal, move 
quickly and finalize it. Asian negotiators, in contrast, move also very slowly in the deal closing 
stage. They, in general, have limited authority to seal the deal themselves and thus have to take 
the proposed deal to their superiors for approval.    
The negotiating process with Indians is also slow and long for several reasons. First, 
they do not work well in teams. Thus, it takes a long time to sort out different perspectives and 
disagreements. Second, Indian negotiators diligently collect a lot of information and analyze it 
carefully in order to ensure that they get the best possible deal. They are constantly looking for 
a better deal. Third, the efficiency of the negotiation process is much less important than the 
final outcome. Therefore, to get the best possible deal, like the Chinese and Japanese, they use 
the  drawn  out  war  of  attrition  designed  to  “exhaust”  the  counterparts  to  concede  to  more 
demands.  
 
5.10. Emotions 
 
All  negotiations  have  some  degree  of  inherent  ambiguity.  Negotiators,  therefore,  engage  in 
sense making activities by looking for clues and visible signs that will help them diffuse the 
uncertainty. One of the ways is to look at their counterpart’s display of emotions. The Confucian 
teaching of xinping qihe – “being perfectly calm” (Shenkar and Ronen, 1987, p.267) makes this 
very difficult for Westerners. Confucianism promotes the notion that a cultivated person must 
exercise self-control and restrain selfish urges to display emotions, especially in public, because 
it threatens harmony. Asians, suspicious of strong emotional displays, distrust individuals who 
cannot contain their emotions and display aggressive behavior.  
Asians, trained to project calm and minimize emotional displays, add another layer of 
uncertainty to the already ambiguous negotiation situation. Westerners, in contrast, tend to be 
animated and openly display soft and raw emotions.  Western negotiators may want to tone it 
down and disengage from the urge to make sense of their Asian counterparts’ emotional state  
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because  doing  so  is  challenging.  However,  it  is  this  challenge  that  justifies  the  use  of 
multicultural interpreters who may be more capable of making sense of the invisible aspects of 
the behaviors of negotiators from different cultures.  
 
5.11. Decisions 
 
Making decisions can range from a top-down style where a single authority makes the decision 
to a consensus decision making style where all the members of a group make the decision 
together. The Chinese and the Japanese use the consensus decision making style. Although 
these societies are hierarchical, leaders refrain from dictating a decision in order to preserve the 
harmonious  relationships  and  give  “face”  to  others.  In  Japan,  for  example,  the  practice  of 
Nemawashi – binding up the roots of the tree prior to its being transplanted – is a decision 
making process that allows people to express ideas before a formal proposal is drawn (March, 
1990,  p.27).  In  this  long  and  slow  process,  leaders  and  followers  exert  caution  and 
consideration ensuring that all reservations and disagreements are ironed out before the final 
decision is made.  
The  consensus  decision  making  process  allows  individuals  to  diffuse  risks  and  be 
shielded from taking personal responsibility. The Western’s notion that an authorized person in 
the  negotiation  room  will  make  a  quick  decision  is  wishful  thinking.  Quite  often  influential 
decision makers are not even at the table. They may appear when there is a good prospect of 
closing the deal.     
In India, unlike China and Japan, decisions most often are top-down and made by the 
higher authority. This is the norm. Indian subordinates expect the higher authority to make the 
decision and will not question it even when they disagree with their superiors. Compliance and 
loyalty are expected. In this respect, the speed of decisions in India can be faster than in Japan 
and China, provided, the Indian bureaucracy is neither needed nor involved in making the deal.   
 
5.12. Teamwork  
 
Asian Chinese, contrary to Westerners and Indians, are excellent team players. They recognize 
that  success  comes  from  compliance  and  contribution  to  the  collective  effort.  Japanese 
negotiators,  so  concerned  with  loyalty  to  the  collective’s  interests,  often  reassure  their 
colleagues that their private interests will not compromise the team’s interests.    
Asian  negotiators  form  well  integrated  and  cohesive  teams  with  clear  roles  and 
responsibilities. The spokesperson, most often, is not the higher authority decision maker. The 
ability of the teams to stay united and work well together is perhaps the greatest strength they 
bring to the table in team negotiations. It would be unwise and futile to try to split Asian teams. 
Their loyalty to the team is paramount and supersedes any potential individual gains they might 
get in the future.      
While Chinese and Japanese are good team players, Indian negotiators do not work 
well together. The typical Indian’s self concept is “I am superior and right” and thus the other 
person is wrong. The team, for an Indian, is to serve him or her and respond to his or her own 
interests. When an Indian team is leaderless and the authority is not well defined, Indians resort 
to extreme individualism and counter conformism, giving freedom to their full selves.    
Westerners have often underestimated the  power of the Chinese and the Japanese 
team unity and loyalty and tried, however unsuccessfully, to create a split among the team’s 
members. Not only will such a move rarely, if ever, succeed; it can lead to a deep sense of 
mistrust. In contrast, the Indians’ difficulties in creating team unity may dispose them to splitting 
and forming a coalition with counterpart negotiators.    
 
6. The Art of War: Mobile Warfare 
 
Asian negotiators had been trained in the Art of War for many centuries. It may be useful also 
for Western negotiators to read the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems (Fang, 1999, 
pp.289-304) and identify the stratagems that their counterparts might use. The more Western  
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negotiators are familiar with the Chinese stratagems, the better they can cope with them and 
hopefully transform the negotiation from a mobile warfare to a joint quest. Here are some of the 
common Chinese stratagems. 
Hide a knife behind a smile: Charm and ingratiate yourself to your adversaries. Once 
you have gained their trust, move secretly and attack them.    
Kill  with  a  borrowed  knife:  Asian  negotiators  use  external  resources  to  their 
advantage. For example, they will use a competitor’s proposals to play the competition against 
each other. Confidential proposals from one competitor are shown to another in order to extract 
better terms. Often negotiations are handled simultaneously with several competitors despite 
promises to the contrary (Seligman, 1989, p.144).   
 
Killing the chicken to warn the monkey: Asian negotiators, in general, are not high 
risk takers. To establish their “high” risk attitude and credibility, they may make a threat on a 
minor issue in order to establish the credibility of their future threats on larger issues. Killing the 
chicken is “a warning shot” (Faure, 1998, p.141). 
 
Sweet  and  sour:  Asian  negotiators  like  to  create  a  psychological  dissonance  by 
changing  approaches  from  the  sweet  and  friendly  to  the  sour  and  cold.  Sometimes  the 
negotiation team will take assigned roles – some sweet and others sour (Pye, 1982).  This is the 
classic good cop, bad cop.   
 
Shaming and guilt: Although “face” in Asia is an important civil value and people go to 
a  great  length  to  refrain  from  causing  others  to  lose  face,  some  Asian  negotiators  do  not 
hesitate to use this taboo against strangers. Asian negotiators have a long memory and to instill 
a feeling of guilt (Seligman, 1989) sometimes go 200 years back – to colonial and imperialist 
times – to remind their counterparts of misdeeds made by their countries. The shaming may 
come together with a display of anger and “drama” – like storming out of the negotiating room.    
 
Lure  the  tiger  to  leave  the  mountain:  Asians  like  to  control  the  location  of  the 
negotiation so that they can be the hosts and not the guests who come to China asking for 
favors from the Court of the Emperor. The home court advantage is both psychological and 
physical. Whereas Asians are in their natural environment, not pressed by artificial deadlines 
and spared of travel expenses, foreign negotiators are cut off from their headquarters, their 
families, and under a deadline pressure to conclude a deal. By controlling the ground, Asians 
can also control the schedule and control the timing (Fang, 1999)  – slowing the negotiation 
process  by  organizing  sightseeing  tours  or  engaging  in  lengthy  consultations  while  the 
counterparts are “on hold.” To establish the principle of reciprocity, foreign negotiators may want 
to schedule some of the negotiations outside Asia, in their own home court.   
 
Await leisurely the exhausted enemy: Asian negotiators understand well the value of 
resources. While they relax and preserve their own resources, they wage a war of attrition to 
frustrate and deplete the counterpart psychologically and physically. For example, the Chinese 
insist that “disputes be arbitrated in Beijing before the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission” (Chang, 1987), or that contracts will be according to the Chinese law and written 
in Chinese only.        
 
Create something of nothing: Take trivial issues and blow them up out of proportion. 
Gain advantage by conjuring illusions (Fang, 1999, p.291). Even when quality or prices are 
reasonable, blow them up – “the price is very high” or the “quality is very low.”   
 
Giving away a brick to earn a piece of jade:  This involves capitalizing on the foreign 
negotiators ignorance and trading something of a low value for something of a high value.  
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7. Suggestions for Negotiating Successfully in Asia 
 
Successful cross-border deal-making begins with understanding the deep cultural values that 
drive behavior. Negotiators should be culturally informed and sensitive. However, it should be 
noted that cultural understanding and sensitivity are not enough. Equally important is strategic 
advantage. Those who go to Asia as takers may not fare well if they do not have much to offer. 
Those who go to Asia as givers and have something to offer – new technologies, new products, 
or new mutually beneficial opportunities – will fare well. Here are some suggestions that may 
facilitate successful negotiations in Asia.  
 
 
Present a long-term vision: The Asian time perspective is historical. Asian negotiators 
appreciate perseverance and long term commitment based on trusted relationships that are built 
slowly and over time. Assure your counterparts that your “Asia play” is a long term play because 
Asians distrust quick deals. You should present a vision based on shared interests first, not just 
benefits.   
 
Build  strong  relationships  and  trust:    Business  in  Asia  is  based  on  personal 
relationships and trust from the heart. Use skilled negotiators who know how to form emotional 
bonds  and  develop  trust  from  the  heart  as  well  as  the  head.  Emphasize  first  personal 
relationships and friendship, openness, and understanding and help. Use trusted intermediaries 
to introduce you and facilitate the process of building relationships and trust. They can play an 
important informal role behind the scene.   
 
Mobile  warfare  and  joint  quest:    Asian  negotiators  are  contextual  and  use  both 
cooperative and competitive negotiating styles. Foreign negotiators should not be trapped in the 
aggressive  mobile  warfare.  To  promote  the  likelihood  that  the  constructive  joint  quest 
negotiating style will be used, proceed with the negotiation after you have established good 
relationships and some degree of trust. 
 
Wide repertoire of behaviors: To succeed in Asia, one must have a wide range of 
skills,  attitudes,  and  behaviors.  In  a  culture  that  tests  resiliency  and  competes  fiercely  for 
resources, you have to be a warrior.  In a culture that promotes harmony, you have to be a 
peacemaker. In a culture where time is plentiful and urgency is a weakness, you have to be a 
monk.  In a culture that values symbols, rituals, and tradition, you must be civilized.  In a culture 
that emphasizes hierarchical social relationships, you have to be respectfully differential. In a 
culture that emphasizes human sincerity and human touch, you ought not to act too legally.    
 
Deemphasize legalism: Relationships and trust between negotiators are much more 
important than just legal agreements. Do not overemphasize legalism by articulating countless 
contingencies  and  “what  ifs.”  Good  relationships  are  a  better  mean  of  taking  care  of  any 
unforeseen future difficulties.   
 
Use cultural boundary spanners:  Western negotiators should study the Asian culture 
and understand it  well. However, it is not possible to fully understand all the cultural subtle 
nuances.  Therefore,  Western  negotiators  would  benefit  from  the  expertise  and  advice  of 
culturally  informed  experts  who  are  more  capable  of  interpreting  the  subtleties  of  a  given 
culture.    
 
Practice patience: Because Asians distrust quick deals, expect deliberate delays and 
sometimes break offs. They are designed to test your resolve. Do not restrain yourself by setting 
an inflexible deadline because time urgency in Asia is interpreted as a weakness. Even when 
you are under time pressure, do what Asians do: Be calm and project the allure that time is not 
of the essence. A prolonged negotiation process is normal, and when it seems that there is no  
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progress, there is, in fact, progress. In the Asian’s thinking, no movement is part of movement. 
When it seems that nothing is happening for a period of time, resist the temptation to push too 
hard forward. Things will move forward when the other side is ripe and willing to move.  
 
Know and commit to your objectives and bottom line: Asian negotiators often play 
the competitors off each other and use the long war of attrition to erode your objectives, the 
things  you  must  get  from  the  deal.  Your  commitment  to  your  objectives  and  bottom  line  is 
critically important, especially in Asia. Focus like a laser beam on what you must get from the 
deal and do not let deadlines, psychological pressure, and fatigue, erode your core interests.   
 
Master the substance and the protocol: Asians prepare meticulously, master well the 
substantive issues, and engage in continuous due-diligence. The Japanese, for example, “ask 
thousands of questions” (Graham, 1986 p.62) and often repeat the same questions in order to 
fully understand the full context of the negotiation. Be prepared to answer a lot of questions. In 
addition, recognize that Asian negotiators take detailed notes of everything and will use them to 
exploit advantages. Do the same: take meticulous notes and use the record to your advantage. 
Always clarify the issues and record mutual understandings in great specificity, leaving minimal 
room for misconstruing the issues.   
     
On-going negotiation: Whereas in the west a done deal is a done deal, in Asia deals 
are  never  done  and  are  often  opened  and  renegotiated  when  the  circumstances  change. 
Therefore, leave room for giving future concessions. Don’t deplete your bank of concessions. 
 
Be humble and fair: Asians dislike foreign negotiators who are arrogant and display 
their superiority in different areas (e.g., science, technology, or management). Be humble about 
what you know and be humbled by what you don’t know. Try to create mutually beneficial and 
fair deals.      
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